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Abstract 
MacCann et al. [Emotion, 14(2), 358-374 (2014)] explored various unidimensional, oblique, 
hierarchical and bifactor models to suggest that ability EI can represent a distinct set of cognitive 
abilities that can be placed within existing intelligence frameworks. The current study presents a 
conceptual replication of these analyses from data collected using alternative (non-proprietary) 
measures. Using a data set of 830 individuals, the current study provides further evidence to suggest 
ability EI best represents a hierarchical construct formed of emotion perception, understanding and 
management factors, structured as a second stratum factor within broader models of cognitive ability. 
Key words: Emotional intelligence; Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT); 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory; Structural Equation Modelling (SEM); Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) 
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A Conceptual Replication of Emotional Intelligence as a Second-Stratum Factor of Intelligence 
Emotional intelligence (EI) is a label assigned to a wide array of affect-related individual differences, 
which, over the past 20 years, have been widely adopted by scholarly researchers and practitioners. 
Adopting a cognitive ability perspective, Mayer, Roberts and Barsade (2008) defined EI as “the 
ability to carry out accurate reasoning focused on emotions and the ability to use emotions and 
emotional knowledge to enhance thought” (p.511). This approach is commonly referred to as ‘ability 
EI’ to differentiate itself from other EI perspectives and has been refined to represent the cognitive 
abilities underpinning the perception, understanding, and management, of emotion (Fan et al., 2010). 
The status of ability EI as a type of intelligence has been contested, however its theoretical context is 
important to a number of recent theoretical models such as the IMAID (Hughes & Evans, 2018) 
which seek to integrate EI with existing individual difference frameworks. Definitional, correlational 
and developmental criteria have been devised and tested to determine whether ability EI can be 
considered an intelligence type, with broadly supportive results (e.g. Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 
1999). There is growing evidence to suggest that ability EI can represent a distinct set of cognitive 
abilities, not simply affective domains of existing abilities, that can be placed within existing 
intelligence frameworks (Bowman, Markham & Roberts, 2002; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2001). For example, MacCann (2010) adopted non-proprietary measures to differentiate 
ability EI from fluid and crystallised intelligence, however there has been little testing of a priori 
theoretical models (MacCann et al. 2014). 
The most robust investigation of the standing of ability EI within intelligence frameworks comes from 
MacCann et al. (2014) whom tested various unidimensional, oblique, hierarchical and bifactor models 
using questionnaire data collected from 688 students. Their data best fit the model in which ability EI, 
loaded by perception, understanding and management factors, was hierarchically structured under a 
general intelligence factor alongside broad ability domains such as quantitative reasoning, fluid 
intelligence, crystalized intelligence, and visual-spatial ability. It was summarised that ability EI could 
therefore be best understood as a second-stratum ability within the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory 
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of intelligence (McGrew, 2009), with a similar standing to that of these other cognitive abilities 
(MacCann et al., 2014).  
MacCann et al. (2014) used the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test to capture ability 
EI (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003), which is one of the most well-known EI 
tools (Fiori et al., 2014). There are so few alternative measures of ability EI that the measure and 
model are often considered analogous (Fiori et al., 2014). Overreliance on this one measure is 
problematic however, as it is difficult to differentiate test effects from construct effects (MacCann & 
Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, the MSCEIT has been critiqued for a number of reasons (Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003), including its proprietary status, factor structure, internal 
reliability, and validity of individual subscales (Fan et al., 2010; Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough, 
2005). Concerns have also been raised regarding the extent to which the MSCEIT can differentiate 
individuals with moderate or high levels of ability EI (Fiori et al., 2014), and the implications of a 
consensus-based scoring method that captures emotional conformity and measurement error (Legree 
et al., 2005; Maul, 2012). 
Based upon the problematic status of the MSCEIT and the psychometric properties of the data it 
produces, the current study presents a conceptual replication of the MacCann et al. (2014) analyses 
from data collected using alternative non-proprietary measures. Using a data set of 830 individuals, 
the current study aims to determine whether previous findings represent MSCEIT test effects, or 
whether conclusions surrounding the second-stratum structure of ability EI within the CHC model can 
be considered robust. 
Method 
Participants 
To meet the most conservative rule-of-thumb estimates (i.e. 10 participants per indicator), 620 
participants were sought (Bentler & Chou, 1987; Nunnally, 1967). Five-hundred and twenty-seven 
participants were convenience sampled through Qualtrics. A further 303 participants were recruited 
through a University research participation scheme and through convenience sampling of social 
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network contacts. In total, 830 individuals (556 females) participated, with 44% aged between 18 and 
30, 25% aged between 31 and 45, 31% aged between 46 and 70, and 4 participants that were 71 years 
old or older. There was no missing data. 
Procedure 
Ethical Approval was gained from Coventry University Health and Life Sciences Ethics Board. All 
participants, regardless of recruitment method, completed the study online, either through Bristol 
Online Survey or Qualtrics. Participants were provided a participation information sheet then 
completed the consent form and battery of questionnaires before being debriefed. Participation was 
part of a larger questionnaire which also featured measures of personality and emotion regulation, and 
typically took around 60 minutes to complete. 
Materials 
Fluid Intelligence - Fluid intelligence was measured by the ICAR 9-item Letter and Number Series 
task (Condon & Revelle, 2014). Participants answer with one of eight answers. Cronbach’s Alpha was 
calculated at .83. 
Crystallised Intelligence - Crystallised intelligence was assessed by the ICAR 16-item verbal 
reasoning task whereby participants picked one of eight answers. A Cronbach’s Alpha of .81 was 
calculated. 
Emotion Perception - Emotion perception was captured by the Ant-Colony Optimised Reading Mind 
in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Olderbak et al., 2015). Ten images of eyes were presented 
and participants chose from 4 options each to identify the emotion being experienced. Unlike the 
original measure, this optimised-version is appropriate because it has acceptable internal reliability, 
and moderately correlates with emotional perception as captured by The DANVA 2 Faces subscale 
(Nowicki & Duke, 1994). The Cronbach’s Alpha was slightly less than desirable at .59.  
Emotion Management - Emotion management was measured by the Situational Test of Emotion 
Management Short Form (Allen et al., 2015). The data had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .65 and involved 
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18 Situational Judgement Test items answered by one of four options, scored according to expert 
mean ratings (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). 
Emotion Understanding - Emotion understanding was assessed by the Situational Test of Emotion 
Understanding Brief, with a 19-item Situational Judgement Test format, five response options and a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .74. 
 
Results 
Reliability, Descriptive Statistics, and Correlations between Variables 
Reliability and descriptive statistics for all measures are shown in Table 1. Cronbach’s Alpha 
estimates were marginal for Emotion Perception and Emotion Understanding but were acceptable for 
all other measures. Pearson correlations among the cognitive ability and ability EI scores are shown in 
Table 1. This matrix demonstrates positive manifold: correlations between all scales are positive. 
Concurrent with MacCann et al. (2014), correlations among ability EI markers tend to be higher 
(average r = .50) than correlations between the ability EI and general cognitive ability markers 
(average r = .38).  
 
Table 1: Reliability, descriptive statistics and correlations for all measures  
 Mean 
(SD) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Fluid 
Intelligence 
4.43 
(2.79) 
(.83) .61* .28* .35* .33* 
2. Crystallised 
Intelligence 
9.26 
(3.65) 
 (.81) .39* .45* .50* 
3. Emotion 
Perception 
7.31 
(2.04) 
  (.59) .43* .48* 
4. Emotion 
Understanding 
10.08 
(2.70) 
   (.65) .60* 
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5. Emotion 
Management 
10.87 
(3.14) 
    (.74) 
Note: Cronbach’s Alpha reported along the diagonal. * = p < .01 
 
Structural Models 
In accordance with the original analyses conducted by MacCann et al. (2014), eight a priori models 
were tested (See Figure 1). First, three models using just the ability EI data explored: a 
unidimensional model (Model 1); a hierarchical model where Perception, Understanding, and 
Management factors loaded onto a second-order ability EI factor (Model 2); and a bifactor model of 
ability EI where each indicator loaded onto both a general ability EI factor as well as their specific 
sub-factor (Model 3). Second, five models using all data explored: a unidimensional model where all 
ability EI and cognitive ability markers loaded onto a g factor (Model 4); an oblique five-factor model 
where five factors of Perception, Understanding, Management, Gf and Gc correlate freely (Model 5); 
a hierarchical five-factor model where the five factors from Model 4 define an overall g factor (Model 
6); a hierarchical model with ability EI as a second-stratum ability, such that a second-order ability EI 
factor is defined by Perception, Understanding, and Management factors, and a higher-order g factor 
is defined by Gf, Gc, and the ability EI factor (Model 7); and a bifactor model where each indicator 
defined both a g factor and one of the five broad group factors described in Model 5 (Model 8; See 
MacCann et al., 2014).  
All models were run using MPlus 6.0 and the Weighted Least Squares Means and Variances 
(WLSMV) estimator, which was considered most appropriate for the categorical and likert-type data 
collected as it makes no assumptions regarding distribution or levels of measurement (Browne, 1984; 
Muthén & Muthén 2010). Consistent with MacCann et al. (2014) and the recommendations of general 
simulation data (e.g., Hu & Bentler, 1999), we consider the CFI, TLI, and RMSEA when evaluating 
model fit. Because the SRMR is not produced with WLSMV estimation we were unable to report this 
statistic. Fit was considered adequate with values of ≤ .08 for the RMSEA (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) 
and ≥ .90 for the CFI and TLI (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980) with values above .95 preferred (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). Chi Square is extremely sensitive to sample size and so whilst presented, is not used 
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for evaluation of model fit. Similarly, WRMR is an experimental fit statistic, and thus whilst included 
for completeness, is not used to evaluate model fit (Muthén & Muthén 2010). See Supplementary 
Materials for all model matrices.  
Emotional Intelligence as a Second Stratum Factor 9 
Figure 1: Simplified illustrations of the eight models tested; G = intelligence; Gf = fluid intelligence; Gc = crystallised intelligence; EP = Emotion Perception; 
EU = Emotion Understanding; EM = Emotion Management 
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Model 1: A unidimensional model of the ability EI test items did not show good fit (X2 (1034, N = 
830) = 1273.29, p < .001; RMSEA = .017; CFI = .891; TLI = .886; WRMR = .900). The average item 
loading was .36, ranging -.24 to .80. 
Model 2: After fixing the factor variance of Emotion Understanding to zero to resolve a Heywood 
Case, the hierarchical model of ability EI shows good fit (X2 (1032, N = 830) = 1205.55, p < .001; 
RMSEA = .014; CFI = .921; TLI = .917; WRMR = .855). The average item loading on each factor: 
Emotion Perception (.47: range .33 to .59); Emotion Understanding (.39: range -.25 to .81); Emotion 
Management (.35: range .18 to .61); second-order ability EI (.88: range .80 to 1.0). 
Model 3: Various bifactor models, where each of the items loaded once onto its theorised group factor 
and once onto a general ability EI factor, were tested. Possibly due to the use of item-level analysis, 
rather than scale-scores as conducted by MacCann et al. (2014), no model converged. Constraining 
factor variance and relationships between group scores was unsuccessful, as was increasing the 
number of iterations. As such, a bifactor model was not compatible with the current data. 
Model 4: A unidimensional model of the cognitive tests and the ability EI tests together did not show 
good fit (X2 (2484, N = 830) = 4142.75, p < .001; RMSEA = .028; CFI = .813; TLI = .808; WRMR = 
1.292). The average item loading was .41, ranging -.21 to .76. 
Model 5: A five-factor oblique model with two cognitive ability sub-factors and three ability EI sub-
factors fitted the data well (X2 (2474, N = 830) = 3017.29, p < .001; RMSEA = .016; CFI = .939; TLI 
= .937; WRMR = .969). The average item loading on each factor: Gf (.75: range .65 to .86); Gc (.61: 
range .33 to .81); Emotion Perception (.46: range .29 to .57); Emotion Understanding (.39: range -.24 
to .82); Emotion Management (.34; range .18 to .56). The mean latent factor correlation was .63 
(range = .43 to .84). 
Model 6: Next, the factor intercorrelations from Model 5 were replaced by a single, higher-order g 
factor. The loadings of the five lower factors onto the higher-order g were all strong (ranging from .72 
to .90; average=.79). Model fit was good, however slightly worse than the oblique five-factor model 
(X2 (2479, N = 830) = 3339.76, p < .001; RMSEA = .020; CFI = .903; TLI = .900; WRMR = 1.068). 
Emotional Intelligence as a Second Stratum Factor 11 
The average item loading on each factor were: Gf (.75: range .64 to .87); Gc (.61: range .33 to .81); 
Emotion Perception (.46: range .29 to .57); Emotion Understanding (.39: range -.25 to .82); Emotion 
Management (.34; range .18 to .54). 
Model 7: Ability EI (loaded by three sub-facets: Perception, Understanding and Management) was 
modelled as a second-stratum factor of g, alongside fluid and crystallised intelligence. After fixing the 
factor variance of Gc to zero to resolve a Heywood Case, the model produced good fit to the data (X2 
(2479, N = 830) = 3016.59, p < .001; RMSEA = .016; CFI = .939; TLI = .938; WRMR = .971). The 
average item loadings were: Gf (.75: range .65 to .86); Gc (.62: range .33 to .82); Emotion Perception 
(.46: range .29 to .57); Emotion Understanding (.39: range -.24 to .82); Emotion Management (.34; 
range .18 to .56). Loadings onto the ability EI factor were strong (.88; ranging .82 to .98), and the 
loading of ability EI onto the g factor (.70) was of similar magnitude to the g-loadings of fluid 
intelligence (.74). 
Model 8: Various bifactor models, where each of the items loaded once onto the group factor and 
once onto g, were tested. Possibly due to the use of item-level analysis, rather than scale-scores as 
conducted by MacCann et al. (2014), no model converged. Constraining factor variance and 
relationships between group scores was unsuccessful, as was increasing the number of iterations. As 
such, a bifactor model was not compatible with the current data. Given there is covariance between 
cognitive abilities, and there are no bifactor theories of intelligence, the assumptions of the bifactor 
model may be less theoretically appropriate than the alternative models captured (Murray & Johnson, 
2013). The lack of a fitting bifactor model was therefore not considered problematic. 
In sum, model fit indices suggest the oblique five-factor model and the hierarchical model with ability 
EI at the second stratum (models 5 and 7 respectively) represent similarly plausible models of the 
current data. Given substantive debate surrounding the importance of the g factor (McGrew, 2009), 
both models can be considered concurrent in presenting ability EI at the second-stratum of cognitive 
ability, and relevant for inclusion in the CHC model. 
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Discussion 
The current study provided a conceptual replication of analyses conducted by MacCann et al. (2014) 
to examine whether ability EI fits within factor models of broad cognitive ability. Concurrent with the 
original results and the broad body of evidence highlighting the value of hierarchical models for 
structuring cognitive abilities, the current paper argues that ability EI can be considered a second-
stratum factor of the CHC model. As to whether an oblique or hierarchical model presents the best 
current available model of understanding, theory should be considered alongside fit indices (Murray 
& Johnson, 2013). In this regard, the hierarchically structured model which is consistent with the 
CHC model of intelligence would seem preferable, especially because such a model would require 
only limited changes as predicted by CHC theory (i.e., the addition of another second-stratum factor; 
McGrew, 2009). Thus, considering both model fit and well-established theory, the results of the 
current study are consistent with MacCann et al. (2014) in suggesting that ability EI is best considered 
as a hierarchically structured (loaded emotion perception, understanding and management) second-
stratum factor within the CHC model of intelligence (MacCann et al., 2014). 
Beyond replicating the results of MacCann et al. (2014), the current findings provide a unique 
contribution to our understanding. The current study had a large sample of participants and used 
different measures for all intelligence and ability EI facets captured. Given the intimate links between 
the MSCEIT (used by MacCann et al. 2014) and the development of ability EI theory, the replication 
of these findings using alternative measures provides evidence to indicate that such results are 
unlikely to represent test effects. Together, the findings provide convincing support for situating 
ability EI within the CHC model as a second stratum factor of intelligence, separate to fluid or 
crystallised intelligence. 
The measurement and structure of ability EI has been dominated by the MSCEIT (Mayer et al. 2003,  
formerly MEIS). Thus, the current study adopted alternative non-proprietary measures: an optimised 
version of the Reading Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001; Olderbak et al. 2015), and 
brief versions of the Situational Test of Emotion Management and Situational Test of Emotion 
Understanding (Allen et al. 2014; 2015). Findings from the data presented suggest that these other 
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measures provide a viable theoretically appropriate alternative to the proprietary MSCEIT. Due to the 
financial costs associated with the MSCEIT, there have been a number of calls for alternative free and 
open-access measures (Mestre et al. 2016). The measures adopted for the current study address these 
calls and may offer wider opportunities for research projects to adopt ability EI. 
The current study adopted few, and brief, measures to minimise participant fatigue. As a result, there 
is limited content coverage of intelligence as a whole, and relatively narrow representation of fluid 
and crystallised intelligence, although scores on the scales adopted closely approximate scores derived 
from longer measures (Condon & Revelle, 2014). Further replications of the current findings with 
greater content coverage (using multiple tests of several abilities) are vital to minimise distortion of 
estimates due to method-related variance and increase the likelihood that bifactor models can be 
estimated. In addition, future research that develops additional non-proprietary ability EI measures 
that exhibit excellent psychometric properties would allow for more reliable estimates of construct-
level variance. This is a particularly pertinent priority given the psychometric shortcomings of the 
MSCEIT and the low reliability of the emotion perception and emotion understanding sub-factors of 
the scales used here (see also Austin, 2010; Olderbak et al., 2015). 
In sum, the current study adds to the growing body of evidence that situates ability EI within 
frameworks of cognitive ability, replicating the main conclusions of MacCann et al. (2014). Currently, 
ability EI best represents a hierarchical construct formed of emotion perception, understanding and 
management factors, structured as a second stratum factor within the CHC model.  
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